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Abstract: Many social enterprises and some companies have developed supply chains with 
the poor as suppliers or distributors to alleviate poverty and to create revenues for 
themselves. Such supply chains have created new research opportunities because they raise 
issues fundamentally different from those examined in the existing operations management 
literature. We report this phenomenon of supply chains with the poor as suppliers or 
distributors in developing countries and identify OM research opportunities. We also provide 
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1. Introduction 
How can supply chain design alleviate poverty? This is the central question that this article 
seeks to raise while providing a starting point for research. Supply chains can source from the 
poor as upstream suppliers of products or services or use them as downstream distributors of 
finished goods. One challenge would be the large number of small transactions and therefore 
the huge transaction costs these suppliers or distributors would require given the vast 
numbers of the poor that form the “base of the pyramid” in any country. Therefore such 
supply chains would require the use of information and communication technology (ICT) to 
manage transactions and bring down transaction costs. Another challenge would be ensuring 
the poor as suppliers or distributors get an equitable share of the supply chain surplus because 
they lack market power. Meeting this challenge would require building supply chains around 
‘social’ business models that seek both profits and poverty alleviation. Increasingly, many 
supply chains are being built with the poor as suppliers or distributors to overcome these 
challenges. This article seeks to report this phenomenon and to identify research 
opportunities for operations management (OM).  
Enterprises built solely around social business models are called ‘social enterprises’ (Seelos 
and Mair 2005), while like-minded efforts of established companies are termed ‘social 
business’ (London et al 2010). The poor that are the focus of such efforts, at least in 
developing countries, are the working poor typified by micro-entrepreneurs, who make less 
than US $5/day in countries like India (Sodhi and Tang 2011). They comprise over 90% of 
the total workforce in India selling products or services in the so-called informal sector not 
subject to any taxes or even minimum-wage restrictions. Many social enterprises and some 
companies seek to create value by entailing these micro-entrepreneurs as suppliers or as 
distributors in their supply chains. The resulting supply chains offer new research 
opportunities because they raise operational issues that are quite different from those 
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examined in the traditional supply chain management literature, in part due to the two 
challenges mentioned above.  
It is helpful to separate upstream supply-chain operations with the “poor as suppliers” of 
products or services from downstream ones with the “poor as distributors” of finished goods 
because the related research opportunities are quite different for these two contexts. Another 
useful thing is to separate the challenges in developing countries, which are primarily 
economic, from those of developed countries, while are primarily social, e.g., the 
rehabilitation of ex-convicts or drug addicts even though both sets of issues are present in 
both type of countries.  
In this paper, we focus on developing countries and use the term “poor” to micro-
entrepreneurs in the informal sector. We report on the phenomenon of such supply chains in 
developing countries and list research opportunities first with the poor as suppliers (upstream) 
and then with the poor as distributors (downstream). We also provide illustrative models to 
serve as seeds for further modeling research, given that most extant research is in the form of 
case studies. Finally, we discuss working capital lending that is necessary for enabling the 
poor to serve as suppliers or distributors: supply chain microfinance specifically presents 
opportunities for OM research, building on the work in the development economics literature 
on microfinance. 
We contribute to the OM literature on the emerging area of socially responsible operations in 
three ways: First, we identify research opportunities in this nascent area. Although 
sustainable development has been studied extensively in the development economics 
literature (Ray 1998; Lal 2000; Hayami 2005), operational issues in this context have not 
been explored much yet. Second, we provide some stylized models that can serve as seeds for 
analytical research in this area. Most of the research, as of this writing, is exploratory and is 
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in the form of case studies (cf. Vachani and Smith 2008; London et al. 2010; and Haksoz et 
al. 2012), although Chen et al. (2012), Devalkar et al. (2011) and McCoy (2012) provide 
welcome first steps towards modeling of specific situations. Finally, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) remains an untapped research area of operations management (Tang and 
Zhou 2012) and our work can provide a starting point for research into companies interested 
in supply chains with the poor aiding the creation of supply chain surplus in their supply 
chains. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews supply chains with the poor as suppliers, 
identifies research opportunities, and provides some analytical models to serve as seeds for 
future modeling-based research. Section 3 does the same with the poor as distributors of 
finished goods. In Section 4, we discuss microfinance and identify research opportunities for 
possible applications to working capital funding for the poor as suppliers or distributors 
before concluding in Section 5. 
2. The Poor as Suppliers 
When micro-entrepreneurs serve as upstream suppliers in a supply chain, the business 
opportunity for them is to access a new market or to get better prices for their output in 
existing markets; the opportunity for the enterprise is to buy goods more cheaply that they 
could otherwise and, at the same time, be seen as contributing towards poverty alleviation. In 
developing countries, social enterprises can help the poor as suppliers by using three basic 
models: 
1) Reducing intermediate echelons to obtain higher selling prices: Micro-entrepreneurs 
in developing countries typically sell their output through layers of middlemen and get 
low prices for their product. This creates an opportunity for social enterprises or 
companies to help the poor by purchasing their output directly. For example, Coconut 
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World purchases coconut sugar made by small farmers in the Philippines directly, and 
then sells directly to consumers through its online store and to other retailers in the US 
(Cameranesi et al. 2010).  Walmart purchases the crops directly from farmers in China: 
farmers can obtain a higher price and Walmart can reduce its procurement cost and have 
fresher produce (An et al. 2012). Another example is that of the social enterprise Arzu, 
which purchases wool rugs directly from Afghan women and sells these in the US. 
2) Reducing search cost: Perishable goods such as fresh produce, fish, or even labor hours 
require balancing the loss of such goods against spending time searching for a customer 
offering a higher price than others. The poor do not have easy way to search for 
customers for their products or services.  In South Africa, Men-on-the-Side-of-the-Road 
(MSR) developed an online portal as a marketplace for day laborers (micro-
entrepreneurs) and homeowners, which helps laborers and potential customers find each 
other (Sodhi and Tang 2011). The same applies to transportation: given that truck owners 
are typically micro-entrepreneurs with a single vehicle, private enterprises have created 
websites offering to match loads from shippers with trucks to help reduce the problem of 
trucks heading back home without a load after delivery, e.g., LoadJunction.com in India 
or 123LoadBoard in South Africa. Chipchase (2006) reports that customer demand 
information available on the mobile phones has helped taxi drivers to increase their 
earnings in Pakistan and Thailand. The same has been reported for fishermen in Kerala 
seeking markets for fish, a perishable product because of the fishermen's lack of access to 
cold chain facilities (Jensen 2007). 
3) Improving productivity:  The poor, especially small farmers, often lack relevant 
information to improve productivity and to increase selling opportunities. In India, 
IFFCO disseminates information about weather forecasts and crop advisory information 
(what to cultivate, when to harvest, and how to improve yield and quality) to farmers via 
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mobile phones so that they can plan their farming activities accordingly. In 2012, 
IFFCO’s recommendation to cultivate sorghum that requires less water to subscribed 
farmers based on its forecasts of deficient rains helped some farmers in India to avoid big 
losses (Ghosal and Parbat, 2012).  Also, Reuters Market Light (RML) tracks the prices of 
50 commodities over 1000 markets and the weather conditions of 2000 locations and 
disseminates crop- and location-specific information to subscribed farmers in India using 
SMS text messages so that farmers can sell their products at a higher price (Preethi 2009).   
Some business models offer all three benefits by exploiting both supply chain structure and 
information technology. Consider Indian consumer-goods giant ITC’s e-Choupal initiative: 
ITC provides farmers the historical selling prices of different crops at different locations on 
its web portal, and ITC pre-announces its own price for purchasing the crops directly from 
the farmers before the market opens the next day. These farmers, who typically till small lots 
of land, can decide whether to sell their produce to the company or at least be aware of a floor 
price when bringing their produce to a commodity marketplace (Anupindi and Sivakumar 
2006; 2007). From a poverty alleviation perspective, ITC's efforts help reduce price 
dispersion and possible higher prices for the farmer: Goyal (2010) reports that the market 
price information provided by the internet kiosks as part of the ITC e-Choupal initiative 
helped farmers obtain higher selling price for their soybeans in Central India. 
2.1 Research Opportunities 
It would be useful to examine different ways for social enterprises or companies to create 
supply chains with micro-entrepreneurs who would otherwise lack market access, market 
information, and selling opportunities.  As such, one research opportunity is studying the 
different types of supply contracts (e.g., wholesale price, revenue sharing, or profit sharing) 
or how the transaction is carried out and to examine poverty alleviation as well as profits for 
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the enterprise. These contracts would include supporting the micro-entrepreneurs' need for 
capital, say, farmers having to buy equipment, seed or fertilizer. 
Another research opportunity would be to further the understanding the value of information 
in increasing revenues for the micro-entrepreneur supplier via such supply chains. Providing 
timely and relevant information to the poor is beneficial by way of reduced search cost and 
improved selling opportunities by way of ICT alone (cf. Jensen 2007), but the evidence on 
income is not so clear. For instance, although Mittal et al. (2010) report that the farmers they 
interviewed reported ‘positive benefits’ by way of higher income because of their RML 
subscriptions, Fafchamps and Minten (2012) did not find any significant differences in price 
received by RML subscribed farmers and regular farmers (i.e., the control group). Indeed, 
when the same price information is available to all buyers and sellers, it may reduce price 
dispersion but in the short time window of the information being provided, say one day, it 
could result in price instability by attracting sellers to and buyers away from locations 
reported as having had high prices, and vice versa for locations that reported low prices the 
previous day. 
On the other hand, combining ICT with supply chain restructuring, as we discussed earlier 
with the example of ITC's e-Choupal initiative, may have a beneficial impact. After all, e-
commerce success depended not only on use of web technology but also on supply chains to 
carry out the physical part of the transactions. The role of the wholesale auction markets in 
India called mandis also needs to be better understood: the auctioneers share information with 
their regular suppliers, i.e.,  farmers, and their regular buyers using mobile phones in the day 
or days prior to auctions, and the auctioneers can be buyers themselves as middlemen.   
Finally, researchers could explore the implications of crop advisory information regarding 
what to cultivate and when to harvest.  It is of interest to examine how to present this 
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information to prevent the “herd effect” (Bikhchandani et al. 1998) of all farmers being 
enticed to grow the same crop and harvest at the same time that could result in much lower 
prices. 
Next, we provide some illustrative models to serve as potential seeds for further research.  
2.2 Modeling the value of direct purchase and direct market access 
Consider a farmer who produces and sells a product through a serial supply chain with   
layers of middlemen.1 The middlemen are indexed as follows: middleman  buys from the 
farmer at unit wholesale price wn and sells to middleman (n-1) at the unit wholesale price wn-
1, who in turn sells to middleman (n-2) at wholesale price wn-2, and so on. Eventually, 
middleman 1 buys the product from middleman 2 at unit wholesale price w1 and sells it at 
retail price p.2 For any p, the market demand q=a – bp, where a, b> 0. Here, the farmer sets 
the wholesale price wn for middleman n, who sets the wholesale price wn-1  for middleman (n-
1), and eventually, middleman 1 sets the retail price p.  Coughlan and Lal (1992) examine a 
more general model with retail competition showing the recursive computation of the retail 
price in equilibrium.  However, we obtain closed-form expressions for the retail price in 
equilibrium without considering retail competition, to obtain the benefits to the farmers and 
the direct distributors explicitly. 
To obtain the optimal pricing we start with middleman : First, for any given wholesale price 
, middleman  solves: , and the optimal retail price  and 
the corresponding selling quantity  to the market satisfy: and  
 Next, for any given , , middleman  k solves  
0n
n
1
1w 1 1 1 1( ) max ( )( )pw p w a bp     p
1( )q w
 1
1( )
2
a bw
p w
b
  
1 1( ) ( )q w a bp w
    kw 2k n  
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, where  is the selling quantity of 
middleman . The optimal wholesale price  is then  
The corresponding quantity is given by 
 
Finally, consider the farmer’s problem: , where  is the 
selling quantity of middleman n. The optimal wholesale price   ݓ௡כ selected by the farmer and 
the corresponding selling quantity   ݍ௡כሺݓ௡ሻ are:  ݓ௡כ ൌ  ௔ା௕௖ଶ௕   and   
ݍ௡כሺݓ௡ሻ ൌ ܽ െ ܾ݌כሺݓଵכ ቆݓଶכ ൬… ቀݓሺ௡ିଵሻכ ሺݓ௡כሻቁ൰ቇሻሻ. 
By using the optimal ݓ௡כ and the “nested” relationship, we obtain:  
Proposition 1. In a serial supply chain with  middlemen, the optimal retail price  and 
the farmer’s optimal profit  satisfy:  
  (1) 
When the farmer sells direct (i.e., ), the optimal price equals  and the optimal profit 
equals . However, Proposition 1 shows that in our model, each additional echelon  of 
an existing supply chain  would result in double marginalization: the farmer suffers from a 
lower profit due to lower price and the final customers (e.g., retailers) end up paying a higher 
price. Therefore, unless each layer adds value  by way of (1) increasing the market size , (2) 
helping reducing the price sensitivity  by improving quality, or (3) reducing the farmer’s 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( ) max ( ) ( )
kk w k k k k
w w w q w      ( 1) ( 1)( )k kq w  
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b
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production cost , getting rid of intermediate layers creates value for the farmers and final 
customers.  Thus, Coconut World has created a profitable distribution model for itself 
through direct purchase from farmers and through direct sales to consumers. 
However, a caveat to the above reasoning is that the role of middlemen can be much more 
complex than what we assume above. The economics literature has discussed different roles 
of middlemen by way of holding inventory or helping customers distinguish quality.  Also, 
the allocation of fixed costs may also benefit the farmer owing to the way fixed costs are 
allocated to different entities in the supply chain. We also note that in India, the mandi system 
was created by the state governments to help farmers get better prices than they were getting 
prior to the creation of these places of auction, and the auctioneers can also be middlemen.   
2.3. Modeling the value of search cost reduction 
To illustrate how market information can enable day laborers, farmers, fishermen, and other 
such micro-entrepreneurs to improve their earnings, consider a risk-neutral micro-
entrepreneur who needs to search for a customer (or a market) to sell one unit of his 
service/product.  For ease of exposition, consider the case when there are infinitely many 
potential customers (or markets) with the i'th customer willing to buy the service/product at 
price Xi; i=1,2,…..  While the micro-entrepreneur knows that Xi  has a probability distribution 
F(.), he does not know the value of Xi  ex-ante.  However, to reveal the offer of each 
customer, the micro-entrepreneur incurs a search cost c > 0 tied to travel or referrals. 
After incurring this search cost, the micro-entrepreneur receives an offer x from a new 
customer.  Should he accept this offer or should he continue to seek a better offer? Consider 
the following stopping rule: the micro-entrepreneur will accept an offer x if and only if   x ≥  
c + z, where z(≥ 0) is a decision variable and (c + z) is the “reservation price” (Lippman and 
c
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McCall 1976).  In other words, the micro-entrepreneur will stop searching the first time he 
receives an offer A that exceeds his reservation price. 
To show that the micro-entrepreneur will increase his earnings if he can leverage information 
technology to reduce his search cost, let us compute his expected profit. Let p be the 
probability that he will receive an offer that exceeds the reservation price (c+z) during any 
search so that  p = 1 – F(c+z), where p  is decreasing in  c and z.  Also, observe that the 
accepted offer A = (X| X ≥  c + z), where E(A) = E(X| X ≥  c+z) is decreasing in c and z. 
Therefore, the micro-entrepreneur’s expected profit is: 
Πሺܿሻ ൌ ܯܣܺ௭ஹ଴Πሺܿ, ݖሻ            ൌ ܯܣܺ௭ஹ଴∑ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௞ିଵ݌ሾെ݇ܿ ൅ ܧሺܣሻሿ ൌ ܯܣܺ௭ஹ଴ ሾஶ௞ୀଵ െ ௖௣ ൅ ܧሺܣሻሿ  (2) 
The above expression captures two observations: (a) the micro-entrepreneur will accept the 
k
th offer when all previous  (k-1) offers were below the threshold (c+z) with probability  (1-
p)k-1 and the kth offer exceeds the threshold and (b) when accepting the kth offer, the expected 
payoff is   -kc + E(A), the result of k searches and the expected accepted offer. For any given 
search cost  c, we can use the fact that p and E(A) are decreasing in z to show that the 
expected earning Π(c, z) given in (2) is also decreasing in z.  Hence, the optimal z* = 0.  In 
other words, it is optimal for the micro-entrepreneur to accept an offer  x ≥  c.3 By 
substituting z* = 0 into (2) and using the fact that p and E(A) are decreasing in c, we can show 
that the resulting Π(c)is also decreasing in  c.  In other words, if the search cost is reduced, 
the micro-entrepreneur's expected earnings will increase.  
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2.4. Modeling the Impact of Price Information and an Alternative Channel 
We now present a model to illustrate the value of price information. At any mandi in India, 
the farmers engage commission agents to display their produce, and the buyers engage their 
commission agents to bid on their behalf at certain pre-specified maximum bids. While the 
open auction mechanism appears to be fair, the farmers can face four major challenges 
(Anupindi and Sivakumar 2006; 2007): (C1) they lack advance information about the market 
price; (C2) they are under pressure to sell because they have already incurred the sunk cost 
for transporting the produce to the mandis; (C3) they may get treated unfairly because of 
unreliable assessments of quality and quantity of the produce especially when the 
commission agents are buyers themselves; and (C4) they may not get full payment 
immediately from the commission agents. State governments usually attempt to mitigate 
these challenges but they remain nonetheless. 
2.4.1. Market Price Information.  To examine the benefit of overcoming challenge (C1), 
consider the case when a risk-averse farmer has a maximum of K units of soybeans to sell. 
The farmer estimates that the trading price at a mandi on the next day p is uncertain, 
where  ݌~ܰሺߤ, ߪଶሻ.  To model risk aversion associated with any amount of money z, assume 
the farmer has a utility function U(z) = 1 – e-rz , where  r > 0 represents the coefficient of 
constant absolute risk aversion (e.g., Pratt 1964).  Faced with uncertain price p, the farmer 
has to decide on the quantity q ≤ K to be sold. To model challenges (C3) and (C4) as stated 
above as well as to incorporate the agent’s commission, assume that the “effective unit 
selling price” is p, ( < 1) and the “effective quantity” measured by the agent at the mandi 
is q,  1. To eliminate the trivial case that the farmer is better off not selling at all, it 
suffices to consider only the situation where  exceeds c, the sunk cost for transporting 
each unit of produce. Accounting for the transportation cost and the effective payment, the 
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farmer’s net profit .  Hence, the farmer’s problem is
Because  p ~ N(µ, σ2), 
 for any parameter  so that the farmer’s problem becomes: 
.  
Proposition 2. When the selling price p ~ N(µ, σ2 ), the optimal selling quantity  and the 
optimal expected utility are decreasing in the price uncertainty , where:  
 (3) 
Proof of Proposition 2: By considering the bound and the first order condition of the 
objective function, we obtain and as stated in (3), where  is decreasing in . When 
,  and , where  U*is decreasing in . When 
, and , where U* is decreasing in . ■ 
Proposition 2 implies that with decreasing , the farmer will increase his selling quantity  
and will earn a higher profit, getting higher utility . Therefore, if RML can provide 
farmers with more accurate market price information via mobile phones so that the effective 
σ is lower -- Jensen (2007) among others investigates price dispersion in a similar context -- 
then farmers can earn more by subscribing and RML can get revenues from these 
subscriptions. 
2.4.2. Market Price Information and Alternative Channel.  In addition to market price 
information, we now examine the value of ITC’s e-Choupal initiative as an alternative sales 
channel. To overcome challenge (C1) for the farmer, ITC provides the commodity prices 
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traded at various mandis at different locations in the previous day on its web portal (via a 
kiosk located at the village).4  As an alternative sales channel for farmers, ITC announces its 
“direct” purchasing unit price x.  To “isolate” the effect of this alternative sales channel, we 
assume that ITC estimates that the trading price at a mandi on the next day p is uncertain, 
where , so that price uncertainty remains the same as before. Therefore, the 
farmer has two options: (a) sell at the mandi at an uncertain market price p, or (b) sell to ITC 
at the announced unit price x.  
Suppose the farmer accepts ITC’s announced price , where is determined by ITC. Then 
the farmer will receive full payment without having to pay any commission or suffer any loss 
in the measurement of the quantity sold so that α = β= 1 (Anupindi and Sivakumar 2006; 
2007). Accounting for the transportation cost, the farmer’s net profit is equal to 
. Hence, for any price , the farmer aims to maximize his utility by solving 
 Note that the objective function is increasing in  so the 
optimal selling quantity  and the farmer’s optimal utility By 
comparing the optimal utility when selling through the mandi given in Proposition 2 and 
the optimal utility when selling directly to ITC , we get:  
Corollary 3. if and only if  satisfies the following conditions: (1) 
 when ; and (2)  when . 
Proof of Corollary 3: First, when , equation (3) implies that  and 
. We obtain condition (1) by comparing U* and ෡ܷכሺݔሻ.  When 
,  and . We obtain condition (2) by comparison. ■ 
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Corollary 3 has two implications: First, when the farmer’s capacity  is small, we can use 
the fact that α < 1 and as well as condition (1) to show that a risk-averse farmer prefers 
to sell his crop to ITC even when ITC offers  that is below the expected price .  
Second, when the farmer’s capacity ,  condition (2) implies that 
 based on our starting assumption that . So to entice 
the farmer to sell his crop to ITC directly, ITC needs to offer . Because   1, 
Corollary 3 reveals that, by providing market price information and by offering an alternative 
sales channel to the farmer can lead to a win-win situation: ITC can buy the crop at a price 
below the expected market price , and the farmer can obtain a higher profit by selling 
directly to ITC.   
3. The Poor as Distributors 
In developing countries, the distribution infrastructure is inadequate and formal distribution 
channels do not reach most consumers unlike in developed countries with large retailers and 
their supply chains. As such, a social enterprise or a company can use micro-entrepreneurs to 
distribute finished goods in order to overcome the high cost of ‘last mile’ distribution.  
Developing distribution strategies that entail micro-entrepreneurs are essential for poverty 
alleviation (Prahalad 2005).  Also, there are research opportunities because the OM literature 
on distributing products or services in rural areas of developing countries is rather scant 
(Tang and Zhou, 2012).  
A social enterprise or a company can help reducing distribution cost by using micro-
entrepreneurs as distributors. For example, Mozambique-based VidaGas uses micro-
entrepreneurs to sell propane gas to food-stall owners, fishermen, health clinics, etc. (Watson 
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and Kraiselburd, 2009). Vision Spring sells affordable reading glasses to low-income 
individuals through a network of micro-entrepreneurs in various developing countries 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2010). In East Africa, Coca-Cola bottlers deliver over $500 million worth 
of product to 1,800 “manual” distribution centers operated by 7,500 micro-entrepreneurs.  
There micro-entrepreneurs use push carts or even bicycles to distribute the product to small 
retailers (who are also micro-entrepreneurs) in congested areas, making frequent but small 
deliveries to these cash-strapped micro-retailers (Cummings 2012;Yadav et al. 2011). In 
2000, Hindustan Unilever, a subsidiary of Unilever in India, started Project Shakti in 50 
villages with woman-entrepreneurs receiving training and stocks of consumer-packaged 
goods from Unilever’s rural distributor to sell the goods to consumers and micro-retailers in 
6-10 villages (Rangan and Rajan, 2007). Social enterprises like Living Goods and Solar 
Sisters, both operating in Uganda, also use women micro-entrepreneurs to do last-mile 
distribution of household necessities and solar lamps respectively thus emulating the model 
of the famed Avon Ladies (Economist 2012).   
The basic distribution strategy entailing the poor as distributors is a hub-and spoke strategy. 
An enterprise can set up a center in a larger village as a “hub” from which micro-
entrepreneurs (or employees) can travel to the more remote rural areas as “spokes” to sell 
goods or provide services. Coca Cola's distribution in East Africa is an example with each 
manual distribution center 'hub' itself being operated by a local entrepreneur and these hubs 
being supplied in turn from a bottling plant as a hub-of-hubs. 
Such a distribution network can further benefit from (a) using existing commercial/non-
commercial networks for moving goods to the micro-entrepreneurs or (b) providing 
additional services at the hub or sell more products or services to create more supply chain 
surplus. This is called a piggy-back strategy.  In Africa, Cola Life, an independent UK 
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charity, hopes to bring “social goods” such as oral dehydration salts, high dose Vitamin A 
and water purification tablets to rural villages using a wedge-shaped container called an 
AidPod that fits between the Coca Cola bottles in their crates, thus reducing distribution costs 
(Yadav 2011). Gramin Suvidha Kendra, a private-public partnership between MCX and 
Indian Post Office established in 2006, distributes seeds, fertilizers, water purifiers, 
micronutrients and solar lanterns to farmers via the ubiquitous post offices in India (Vachani 
and Smith, 2008). 
3.1. Research Opportunities 
OM researchers have examined last-mile logistics in time-sensitive contexts arising from 
humanitarian disaster reliefs or health care service (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009).  
For example, Stapleton et al. (2009) examine the trade-offs between agility, adaptability and 
alignment to propose improved performance of the last-mile vehicle supply chain for the 
humanitarian logistics efforts of for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC). McCoy (2012) has proposed an optimization model for “Riders 
for Health” in Africa to reduce the downtime of its current fleet of motorcycles owing to 
unavailability of spare parts. Apte (2009), McCoy (2012), and Pedraza and Van Wassenhove 
(2011) provide details about the challenges arising from humanitarian logistics – some of 
these challenges apply to distribution and may interest researchers of social business models 
pertaining to the poor as distributors. 
However, efficient distribution strategies for enabling micro-entrepreneurs in developing 
countries to buy, distribute, and sell products have not been studied much. Moreover, for 
piggy-back distribution, it is not clear how the value created should be shared between the 
network owner and the enterprise or micro-entrepreneurs. For example, how much should 
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Coca Cola charge Cola Life for distributing its AidPods? How much should India Post charge 
Gramin Suvidha Kendra? 
For hub-and-spoke distribution, inventory issues arising from  a hub-and-spoke system with 
many micro-entrepreneurs as spokes provide interesting research opportunities. For example, 
a hub-based inventory at a centralized warehouse reduces the inventory due to the “pooling” 
effect, but makes it costly for the micro-entrepreneurs to replenish their inventories especially 
if they have to do so frequently owing to limited purchasing power.  For example, NE Green 
Power (India) distributes and sells solar lamps and related products using a centralized 
warehouse that the micro-entrepreneur distributors find inconvenient (Jue 2011). On the other 
hand, the total inventory at the spokes would be much greater than it would be if it were only 
at the hub, raising the question of who should own this inventory. In general, involving local 
entrepreneurs as informal sales force in developing countries creates new research 
opportunities to extend the existing marketing and the OM literature in the area of sales force 
planning, sales territory design, and incentive design (Lilien et al. 1992).  
3.2. Modeling the Hub­and­Spoke Distribution Strategy with PiggyBacking 
We now present an illustrative model that captures the hub-and-spoke distribution strategy 
with piggybacking as adopted by Vision Spring (VS).  VS sells reading glasses using micro-
entrepreneurs as spokes in a hub-and-spoke model. Moreover, VS uses piggybacking to 
leverage the spokes to send customers needing specialized services to the hub to sell them 
prescription glasses. To keep the inventory cost low (for itself and the micro-entrepreneurs), 
VS sources only three strengths of reading glasses from China, and sells them through micro-
entrepreneurs as “spokes” by providing them with $75 worth of eye charts, brochures, and a 
stock of the three basic strengths of glasses (Sodhi and Tang 2011).  Because it is too costly 
to send optometrists to the field as spokes, VS opened optical shops at the hub level with 
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optometrists to sell prescription glasses.  This way, the micro-entrepreneurs can sell basic 
reading glasses, and refer customers with more specialized optical needs to the hubs with 
optical shops. 
Vision Spring’s distribution strategies can be modelled as a distribution network comprising 
one optical shop (i.e., central warehouse or hub) and n local entrepreneurs (i.e., retailers or 
spokes). The demand occurred at each retailer  during any given time period  is normally 
distributed with mean  and standard deviation .  By assuming that the demand is 
independent across different time periods and across different retailers, the total demand 
experienced at the central warehouse during any given time period  is normally 
distributed with mean  and standard deviation .  
3.2.1. The spoke distribution for reading glasses. We follow Lee and Tang (1997) for 
tractable analysis in using the assumption that the central warehouse and the retailers hold 
inventories, in our case of reading glasses, so that the distribution system can be 
“decomposed” into  subsystems.5 Let  be the replenishment lead-time of the central 
warehouse from the factory and let  be the replenishment lead-time of each retailer  from 
the warehouse.  By assuming that the warehouse and each retailer replenish their inventory 
according to an “order up-to level” policy, the expected total inventory (in-transit and on-
hand)  in any time period satisfies:  
  (4) 
where  is safety factor (Peterson and Silver 1979).  For each time period, let  be the fixed 
operating cost of the central warehouse,  be the fixed operating cost of each retailer,  be 
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the unit production cost, and h be the unit inventory holding cost. Hence, the total system cost 
of the entire distribution for each time period can be written as:  
  (5) 
3.2.2. Piggybacking for prescription glasses at the hub. The micro-entrepreneurs do not 
hold inventory of prescription glasses, which are prepared only at hubs under the care of an 
optometrist.  Piggybacking on the spokes,  VS pays micro-entrepreneurs an incentive  for 
“referring” a customer to the optical shop at the “hub” for prescription glasses.  Here, the 
warehouse has to satisfy the total demand referred by all  retailers. By using the same 
approach as before, the expected total inventory (in-transit and on-hand)  in any time period 
can be expressed as (Peterson and Silver 1979):  
   
Accounting for the referral cost, the total system cost for this case satisfies:  
  (6) 
To examine whether the distribution strategy selected by VS for distributing reading glasses 
prescription glasses is effective, we compare the system costs and given in (5) and (6) 
and obtain:  
Proposition 3. < if and only if  
Proposition 3 implies that the piggybacking on the spokes for distributing at the hub is more 
cost effective when the product demand is highly uncertain (i.e., when  is large) or when 
the retailer’s replenishment lead time  is high.  These two conditions fit the characteristics of 
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demand of prescription glasses so the distribution model is quite suitable, which is not the 
case for reading glasses.  
4. Working Capital Lending for the Poor as Suppliers or Distributors 
Micro-entrepreneurs have little access to credit from traditional banks not only because of 
lack of credit history or collateral but also because of the small amounts of money involved 
relative to the transaction cost for the bank for screening and collection. Therefore, social 
enterprises and companies must also find ways to finance the working capital if they are to 
engage the poor as suppliers or distributors. For example, as already noted, Vision Spring 
provides each micro-entrepreneur in its supply chain with $75 worth of eye charts, brochures, 
and a stock of reading glasses.   
In general, there are different types of microfinance models for micro-entrepreneurs to obtain 
micro-loans: 
1) Self-help groups (SHG)/ Rotating Savings and Credits Associations (ROSCAs). A 
community of the poor can form self-help groups, where all members bring savings to 
weekly (or monthly) meetings, and one of the members receives the weekly savings from 
other members as a loan (Ardener 1995, Snow 1999). Clearly, this approach will be difficult 
to use for working capital funding although it might be useful for a micro-entrepreneur to 
purchase capital goods like a bicycle. 
2) Community banks.  These banks seek to stimulate economic development (in terms of 
business and job creation) for their communities. Grameen Bank uses “group lending” to 
reduce its screening, monitoring and collection costs: all members in a group are responsible 
to provide the repayment when one of the members is behind (Foroohar 2010). Group 
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lending for working capital funding may be particularly beneficial if all members of the 
group are suppliers or distributors in the same supply chain and both materials and cash flows 
can be aggregated at the group level. 
3) Peer-to-Peer Networks. Kiva is a person-to-person online lending organization that 
enables people in developed countries to provide micro-loans (Flannery 2007). So this could 
be used for funding micro-entrepreneurs wishing to be suppliers or distributors, but more for 
investment in capital goods rather than working capital.  
4) Commercial MFIs: SKS is a for-profit, publicly traded microfinance organization in India 
that uses capital markets to scale up its operations quickly and uses information technology to 
reduce operating cost (Akula, 2008). Such a system could also be useful for working capital 
funding if micro-entrepreneurs can keep rotating balances. 
Microfinance can be particularly compelling if lending is limited to working capital for the 
poor as suppliers or distributors over repeated transactions in supply chains. We can call this 
specialization supply chain microfinance. The fact that lending is limited to pre-paying for 
supplies from the poor or providing goods on terms to them for distribution limits the risk of 
the lender. Collection costs are also reduced because collection can piggyback on the transfer 
of goods. Repeated transactions increase trust, allowing for increased lending. Transaction 
costs and therefore interest rates are greatly reduced if we tie micro-lending to the actual 
transaction. Moreover, aggregation of suppliers or distributors can fit the group lending 
model well as we already noted.  
For instance, if instead of a company selling to the micro-entrepreneurs on a cash basis could 
provide them the inventory on credit till the end of the day would limit the lender's risk to the 
value of one day's inventory (Sodhi and Tang 2013). Similarly, ITC could lend to farmers 
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before the sowing season and then gets its money back by receiving the produce when the 
farmer brings produce to ITC directly or receiving cash when he sells his produce on the 
mandi. Indeed, the social enterprise Arzu goes further into capital lending by renting out 
equipment and letting the women buy it over time through their role as suppliers of rugs. To 
our knowledge, this type of lending is rather limited in practice, with Vision Spring being 
more of an exception than a rule, and even Unilever sells its products to the women-micro-
entrepreneurs on a cash basis. 
4.1 Research Opportunities 
Economists have studied microfinance since the early 1990s. Research topics include: (a) the 
value of microfinance (Armedáriz and Morduch 2007); (b) the effectiveness of those four 
microfinance models mentioned above (Komera 2008); (c) the impact of lending to women 
versus men (Pitt and Khandker 1998 and Kevane and Wydick 2001); (d) the determination of 
optimal interest-rate for lenders to charge for those micro-loans (Conning 1999); and (e) the 
impact of group lending versus individual lending especially when group lending enables 
group members to screen, monitor, and enforce each other’s loans for reducing default risk 
(Karlan 2003; 2007).  
Based on the economics literature on microfinance, the following are OM research 
opportunities in general and for working capital funding in particular: One opportunity with 
micro-lending in general is related to group lending and the group size. There are different 
economic theories on group lending– see Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Brau and Woller 
(2004) for comprehensive reviews.  While Besley and Coate (1995) show that the group 
default risk is lower when the “social collateral” induced by the group is sufficiently high; 
however, Sadoulet (2000) argues that “social collateral” induced by group lending is not 
sufficient to reduce group default risk, albeit in a different setting. Therefore, there is an 
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opportunity for empirical research to test the assumption of risk reduction in group lending.  
The same could be applied to micro-entrepreneurs as distributors when provided with goods 
on inventory on a credit basis. 
Another research opportunity deals with loan repayment. It would be of interest to determine 
the optimal loan repayment schedule that incorporates the following trade-offs: frequent 
repayment schedule reduces the amount of defaulted loans but it increases the lenders’ cost of 
collection. If companies or social enterprises buying from or selling to the micro-
entrepreneurs were to additionally offer micro-loans as working capital to these micro-
entrepreneurs, the loan and its repayment could be tied to their performance as suppliers or 
distributors in terms of productivity or quality. For farmers particularly, it could be 
interesting if companies like ITC could arrange loans to procure seeds and other inputs, and 
then take the payment over time as the farmers bring the product to market.   
A third research opportunity is screening micro-entrepreneurs for lending. To reduce the cost 
associated with default loans, there is a need to develop more effective ways to screen 
potential borrowers. Van Gool et al. (2012) find that traditional credit scoring adopted by 
retail banks is not yet ready to replace the human-intensive screening process conducted by 
MFIs. However, there are research opportunities about effective way to develop new credit 
scoring methods by analyzing the data captured by the financial transactions (remittances, 
loan repayments, payments) conducted over the mobile phones (Lee and Tang, 2012).  Doing 
so makes even more sense if the enterprise buying from or selling to the micro-entrepreneur 
can share information on the financial transactions with the lender (if the lender is a third 
party). Indeed, researchers have used Kiva’s online portal to examine how this information 
would affect lending behaviour among online lenders (Hartley 2010). This can be specialized 
to screening for distributors especially when the goods are being provided on credit. 
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However, the amount of goods being small in quantity, and the lending being limited to a 
single replenishment cycle, means that the risk is low so the screening need not be as 
intensive as lending in general. 
5. Conclusion 
We reviewed examples of supply-chain operations with the poor as suppliers of goods or 
services and those with the poor as distributors of finished goods. Moreover, we listed 
opportunities for OM research and provided some illustrative models as potential seeds for 
further analytical research. Finally, we discussed supply chain microfinance as a 
specialization of microfinance and have listed research opportunities tied to working capital 
lending for the poor as suppliers or distributors. 
OM researchers may find that research in this area can inform supply chains for 
multinationals companies, given the external pressures from governments and consumer-
advocacy groups as well as internal pressures from top executives. At the same time, these 
companies are interested in seeking “the next billion [consumers]” in developing countries 
(Vlad et al. 2011). However, because the existing supply chains are built solely to maximize 
profits, engaging the “poor as suppliers or distributors” would require re-building supply 
chains that are both profitable for the company and socially responsible (Lee 2010).  We hope 
our paper will motivate OM researchers to explore the impact of engaging the poor as 
suppliers or distributors in distributors, helping enterprises make profits while also alleviating 
poverty. 
Besides the research opportunities listed in Sections 2 through 4, there are other avenues for 
future research. These include:(1) exploring other business models in practice and in theory; 
(2) quantifying the value created by different social business models; (3) dividing this value 
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between the enterprise with market power and an individual micro-entrepreneur who has 
none; (4) exploring the similarities and differences between social business models in 
developing countries with poverty and developed countries; (5) seeking to explain the failures 
of less successful social businesses and enterprises via supply-chain design or transaction 
costs, and (6) studying the characteristics of supply chain structures that we call thistle-
shaped to depict the highly arborescent networks with the poor as suppliers or distributors. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
Disintermediation is beneficial to the farmer because it reduces vertical competition.  In addition to this 
benefit, disintermediation can mitigate the “bullwhip effect” as well.  This is because, by reducing the number 
of layers, it is easier for the supply chain partners to communicate and coordinate their planning activities ( 
Lee et al. 1997), and (Sodhi and Tang 2011)).  
2For simplicity, we assume these middlemen do not add any value except handling the transaction.  Also, to 
simplify our exposition, we assume the unit processing cost of each middleman is zero.  
3
We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to explore this idea.  
4 Here, we do not model the auction mechanism at the mandis explicitly.  Instead, we assume that ITC can use 
historical trading prices to forecast the future trading prices at the mandi. 
5We can obtain similar structural result when either the warehouse or the retailers canhold inventories but not 
both. For example, when the warehouse does not hold inventory, one can use the approach as described in Garg 
and Tang (1997), Erkip et al. (1990), and Eppen and Schrage (1981) to determine the expression for the 
expected inventory level in the system. Then by using the same approach, we can identify the conditions under 
which it is more effective for the retailers to refer their customers to collect their product at the warehouse. To 
avoid repetition, we omit the analysis of this setting. 
